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ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY FOR LENDERS AFTER
UNITED STATES V. FLEET FACTORS, CORP.:
DEEP POCKETS OR DEEP PROBLEMS?
In 1978 the reality of America's hazardous waste problem came home to
the country through the conduit of a small residential district in up-state New
York.' Rocks striking the sidewalk sent off colored sparks.2 Foul smelling
chemicals seeped into basements and the drinking water did not taste or smell
right. 3 The country learned that the land on which the Love Canal neighbor-
hood stands formerly served as an industrial waste dump site.
4
Although Love Canal focused the publics attention on hazardous waste,
the problem of hazardous waste was not new to Congress. Two years before
the discovery of Love Canal, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).5 RCRA is intended to control hazardous
substances6 from generation to ultimate disposal (so called "cradle-to-grave"
protection). 7 RCRA is forward looking legislation, designed to control hazard-
1. See Dower, Hazardous Wastes, in Puauc Pouacms FOR ENvniaROmENrAL PROTECION
151, 168 (R. Portney, ed. 1990) (describing hazardous waste damage created at Love Canal).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also B. YANDLE, THE PoxarlcAL Las oF ENviRoNmENTAL REGULATION 107,
108 (1989) (outlining political reaction to Love Canal). Until 1953, the Hooker Chemical Company
owned the land on which the Love Canal neighborhood now stands. Id. at 109. Hooker used a
sealed canal to store hazardous chemicals on the property. Id. In 1953, Hooker sold the land to
the Niagara Falls School Board, after being threatened with surrender of the land through eminent
domain. Id. Hooker gave public warnings as to the hazards on the property and included covenants
and caveats in the deed of sale. Id. The School Board subsequently erected a grammar school on
the site and sold the rest to developers. Id. The sealed canal ruptured during the laying of sewer
lines, and percolation eventually brought the wastes to local homes. Id.
5. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. Rnv. 1459, 1470-76
(1986) (discussing hazardous waste control under RCRA and CERCLA). RCRA originated as an
amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Dower, supra note 1, at 161.
6. See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (defining hazardous substance for
purposes of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
[hereinafter CERCLA]). To define hazardous substance, CERCLA draws on several sources
including the Clean Water Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the Clean Air Act, and § 102 of
CERCLA. Id. Section 102 of CERCLA directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to promulgate regulations designating hazardous substances in addition to the
substances listed in CERCLA § 101(14). CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602. CERCLA directs
the Administrator to designate as hazardous substances any "elements, compounds, mixtures,
solutions, and substances which, when released into the environment may present substantial
danger to the public health or welfare or the environment[.]" Id. See also Dower, supra note 1,
at 152-53 (defining hazardous waste). A simplified defimition of hazardous waste is solid and
liquid waste disposed of on land rather than into the air or water and which potentially adversely
affects human health and the environment. Id. This note uses the terms hazardous waste, toxic
waste and hazardous substance interchangeably.
7. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5, at 1470-71
(describing purpose of RCRA).
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ous waste generation.8 Because RCRA focuses on controlling the present and
future production of hazardous waste, RCRA could not deal with Love Canal
or any of the thousands of other toxic waste dump sites created in this country
prior to 1976.9 In addition, many of the people who created these sites had
abandoned them.'0
In the wake of the public outcry over Love Canal, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980 (commonly known as Superfund'). 2 A lame-duck Con-
gress passed CERCLA as compromise legislation in the last hours of the
Carter Administration. 3 Because of Congress' haste and a compromise at-
mosphere, CERCLA arrived as a complex piece of legislation, filled with
vague terms and little legislative history. 14 Congress addressed some of CER-
CLA's shortcomings in the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) of 1986.'1 In addition, the decisions of several federal courts have
filled out various other provisions of the statute.' 6
8. See, e.g., Dower, supra note 1, at 165-68 (stating main focus of RCRA is curbing future
problems and noting RCRA's inadequacy for dealing with abandoned waste sites); Grunbaum,
Judicial Enforcement of Hazardous Waste Liability Law, in DimENsioNs oF HAZARDous WASTE
Pormcs AN Poucy, 163, 164 (1988) (noting RCRA effective in upgrading some waste sites, but
did not provide solution to problem of cleaning up dormant waste sites); Frank and Atkeson,
Superfund: Litigation and Cleanup, 16 Env't Rep. Pt. II (BNA) 1 (June 28, 1985) (noting RCRA
requires that EPA regulate all aspects of active hazardous waste management).
9. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5, at 1470-71
(discussing failure of RCRA to deal with hazardous waste disposal practices prior to enactment
of CERCLA); Grunbaum, supra note 8, at 164 (discussing judicial interpretation on RCRA limiting
enforcement to imminently hazardous waste sites); Dower, supra note 1, at 165-68 (describing
forward looking nature of RCRA).
10. See Dower, supra note 1, at 169 (discussing difficulty of identifying responsible parties
for abandoned dump sites).
11. See Frank and Atkeson, supra note 8, at 2 (describing creation of $1.6 billion "super-
fund" for hazardous waste cleanup). The name Superfund refers to the trust fund established by
CERCLA to pay for part of the costs of identifying and cleaning-up hazardous waste sites. Id.
Two funds actually exist in CERCLA: a Post-closure Liability Fund for facilities closed by
following applicable CERCLA regulations, and a Hazardous Substance Superfund to cover
government and private clean-up response costs. See CERCLA § 111(a), (j), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a),
(j) (1988) (establishing uses of fund). In the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), Congress allocated up to $8.5 billion for the Superfund. Id. at § 111(a), § 9611(a).
12. Dower, supra, note 1, at 169.
13. Id.
14. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (lth Cir. 1990)
(discussing poor and hasty drafting of CERCLA), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); SiEcURED
CRErros AND SuPESce'm: AvomING ma Lsnu=n NET, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 609, 615 n.5
(July 28, 1989) (criticizing legislative history on definition of "operator").
15. See infra note 99-115 and accompanying text (discussing effects of SARA on CERCLA's
liability scheme). For example, SARA refined the "innocent landowner" defense. See CERCLA
§ 101(35XA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (defining contractual relationship); see also Jaffe
and Schoolman, Hazardous-Waste Legislation Affecting Lender Liability, 107 BANKiNa L.J. 422,
426 (1990) (discussing SARA's effect on innocent landowner defense).
16. See generally United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988)
(determining that liability under CERCLA is strict liability), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989);
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Much of the filling out process undertaken by the federal courts concerned
CERCLA's liability scheme.17 CERCLA provides a liability scheme to assign
responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.' 8 Congress created an
exemption from liability for persons holding indicia of ownership in a vessel
or facility as a security interest, so long as those persons do not get involved
in management of the vessel or facility.19 This exemption is commonly known
as the secured creditor exemption.2 Judicial application of the secured creditor
exemption over the ten year history of CERCLA has been erratic. 21 No
consistent meaning for the secured creditor exemption emerges from these
decisions.2"
In May 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. handed down the first federal appellate
decision interpreting the secured creditor exemption? The Eleventh Circuit
held that a secured creditor is not exempt from CERCLA liability if the
creditor participates in management of the debtor and if the creditor's partic-
ipation can support an inference that the creditor could influence the debtor's
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988)
(same); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); United
States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 (determining CERCLA liability to be joint and several
liability); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating
that joint and several liability under CERCLA turns on factual determination).
17. See supra note 16 (citing various federal courts interpreting CERCLA's liability scheme).
18. See CERCLA § 107 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1988) (establishing parties liable for
cleanup costs under CERCLA). The following persons are liable under CERCLA § 107:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person ... , and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substance for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person....
Id.
19. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (defining owner or operator
under CERCLA). CERCLA provides:
The term "owner or operator" means ... (ii) in the case of an on-shore facility ....
any person owning or operating such facility .... Such term does not include a person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
20. See EPA Official Tells House Panel Of Shift In Policy Toward Lenders, CERCLA
Liability, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 212 (Aug. 6, 1990) (recognizing that CERCLA § 101(20)(A) is
commonly referred to as secured creditor exemption).
21. See infra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (describing history of judicial interpretation
of secured creditor exemption).
22. Id.
23. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.); see also infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing
Fleet Factors in detail).
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hazardous waste treatment policy.? The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the secured
creditor exemption more restrictively than any previous court., This restrictive
interpretation created anxiety among lending institutions. 26
A review of the statutory scheme of CERCLA, the legislative history of
CERCLA, and previous judicial decisions interpreting the secured creditor
exemption demonstrates that the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Fleet Factors is
ill-conceived. 27 Because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to
examine the Fleet Factors decision, the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
secured creditor exemption stands as good law, at least in the Eleventh Circuit.n
To remedy the problem of interpreting the secured creditor exemption, Con-
gress should revise CERCLA, making explicit those parties exempted from
CERCLA liability and documenting in the legislative history the policy behind
the exemption. 29
An overview of CERCLA's operation is necessary to understand the flaws
in the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Fleet Factors.3 0 An underlying tenet of
CERCLA is that the polluter should pay.3' CERCLA gives the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) the power to take remedial action by responding
immediately to a release or a threatened release of hazardous waste by
performing a cleanup of the site. 2 The EPA then may sue any of the potentially
24. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th. Cir. 1990)
(interpreting CERCLA's secured creditor .exemption), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
25. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text (comparing Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
of secured creditor exemption in CERCLA with holdings in several other CERCLA lender liability
cases).
26. See Boston Globe, Sept. 18, 1990, at 33 (discussing lender reaction to Fleet Factors).
According to The Boston Globe, the chief lobbying group for lenders, the American Bankers
Association, made environmental liability the Associations number one "congressional priority"
in 1990. Id.
27. See infra notes 200-62 and accompanying text (marshalling evidence to challenge Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of secured creditor exemption).
28. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 752 (1991).
29. See infra notes 276-84 and accompanying text (demonstrating need for legislative solution
to resolve ambiguity in secured creditor exemption).
30. See infra notes 31-53 and accompanying text (describing CERCLA in operation).
31. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553 (1990) (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis
Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990), for proposition that underlying purpose
of CERCLA is to make those responsible for chemical disposal pay for cleanup of hazardous
waste); United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d. 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989)
(describing underlying tenant of CERCLA as desire to make parties responsible for pollution pay);
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (same).
32. See CERCLA § 104 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (a) (1988) (designating response authorities).
CERCLA § 104(a) authorizes the President to act in response to any release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance. Id. CERCLA authorizes the President to take any action necessary to
protect the public health or welfare or the environment that is consistent with the national
contingency plan. Id. CERCLA § 105 mandated that the national contingency plan, developed
under the Clean Water Act, be updated to include a national hazardous substance response plan.
42 U.S.C. § 9605; see also Frank and Atkeson, supra note 8, at 9-10 (June 28, 1985) (describing
nature and function of national contingency plan as developed under Clean Water Act and
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responsible parties (PRPs) to recover the costs of the cleanup.33 Additionally,
private citizens may take remedial actions to hazardous waste problems and
recover the costs associated with their remedial action from the Superfund
and from the parties responsible for the release.34
Once the EPA determines that a site requires remedial action, CERCLA
allows the agency to proceed in one of two ways. 5 The EPA either may
promote private response or undertake an agency response to effect the
cleanup.3 6 Pursuing private action to effect the cleanup may include a settlement
agreement between the EPA, the state, and the responsible parties concerning
performance of the cleanup. 37 If the PRPs and the EPA cannot agree to a
settlement, the EPA can seek a court order to have the responsible parties
perform the EPA mandated remedial actions. 38 Civil fines follow if the
responsible parties do not perform the cleanup. 39 If the EPA chooses to
undertake agency response, then the EPA performs the remedial actions and
sues the potentially responsible parties to recover the government's costs.40
CERCL § 105). In accordance with CERCLA § 115, the President delegated the response
authority authorized under CERCLA to the EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12316, 46 Fed. Reg.
42237 (1981) (delegating to EPA responsibilities assigned to President under CERCLA).
33. See CERCLA § I 12(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c)(3) (1988) (authorizing Attorney General
to bring recovery action against PRPs for costs or damages). In addition to actual costs or
damages, CERCLA authorizes punitive damages against liable persons who fail to provide removal
or remedial actions without sufficient cause. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). The
amount of punitive damages awarded may vary between a minimum of the costs incurred because
of the person's failure to provide remedial action and a maximum of three times those costs. Id.
34. See CERC.A § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (establishing liability for
private response). Liable persons are responsible for costs incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan. Id. This private action impacts the usefulness of any agency
rulemaking on interpretations of the CERCLA exemptions. See infra note 284 and accompanying
text (describing proposed EPA rulemaking to clarify meaning of secured creditor exemption).
35. See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988) (outiining response authorities available
to the EPA).
36. See CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988) (authorizing EPA to either commence
response action or allow private response action after review of proposed private response); see
also J. AcToN, Ur=ANms iNm G SurPRmuND: A PRoaz.s REPORT 41 (1989) (detailing division of
past cleanups between private action and agency' action). The EPA, after determining that the
release or threatened release of hazardous material creates an imminent and substantial danger to
public health, welfare or the environment, may secure orders through the local federal district
court to force a private cleanup. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). Persons who willfully
violate or fail to comply with a cleanup order from the federal district court may be fined up to
$25,000 a day for as long as the failure or violation persists. Id. § 106(b), 42 U.S.C § 9606(b).
37. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988) (giving EPA authority to settle with
potentially responsible parties).
38. See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988) (establishing procedures for abatement
actions); see also Grunbaum, supra note 8, at 171-72 (discussing different methods available to
EPA for forcing cleanups).
39. See CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988) (establishing fines for non-
compliance with administrative order). A federal district court may levy a fine of up to $25,000
per day for failure to comply with administrative clean-up orders. Id.
40. See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988) (establishing response authorities);
CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (outlining procedure for civil action to recover response costs);
1991]
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CERCLA defines four classes of PRPs: present owners or operators, past
owners or operators, generators, and transporters. 4' Despite the premise that
the polluter should pay, CERCLA assigns liability to present owners or
operators without regard for the present owner's or operator's actual involve-
ment with the generation or disposal of hazardous waste at the facility.42 A
purpose of present owner or operator liability is to prevent responsible parties
from making sham transfers of land to escape liability for possible cleanup
actions.43 Because of present owner liability, prospective purchasers should
discount known contaminated sites."4 Without present owner liability, remedial
action by the EPA after the property is transferred would create a windfall
for the present owner as the value of the property increases after cleanup. 45
If hazardous waste disposal occurred under previous ownership or oper-
ation, these past owners or operators are liable for any remedial actions taken
under CERCLA." Hazardous waste generators are liable for the costs of
remedial actions taken on sites where the generator deposits hazardous wastes. 47
Transporters of hazardous waste are responsible for remedial actions taken at
sites the that transporters chose for disposal or treatment of hazardous wastes.4"
PRPs are liable for all costs of remedial action that either the government
or private parties incur.4 9 In addition, PRPs are liable for damages due to
see also Grunbaum, supra note 8, at 171-72 (discussing different methods available to EPA for
forcing clean-ups). Whenever there is a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
substantially threatening the public, or a release or threatened release of pollution or contamination
posing an imminent and substantial threat to the public, the EPA may respond as outlined in the
national contingency plan. CERCLA § 104, U.S.C. § 9604. After the cleanup response, the EPA
can bring an action to recover the cleanup costs. CERCLA § 113, U.S.C. § 9613. Section 113 of
CERCLA establishes jurisdiction, venue, statute of limitations, right to contribution and nationwide
service of process. Id. For example, in United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., the EPA
notified the PRP that the PRP had approximately four months to effect a cleanup of the
contaminated property, but the PRP declined to take any remedial action. United States v.
Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Md. 1986).
41. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1-4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4) (1988) (establishing PRPs under
CERCLA).
42. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988) (assigning liability to present
owners or operators). Present owners or operators of a facility that took the facility without
knowledge of past hazardous waste activity may avail themselves of the innocent landowner
defense. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (establishing defenses to CERCLA liability);
CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (defining contractual relationship).
43. See H.R. Rm. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt.l at 62-64 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CoNo & ADmN. NEws 6119, 6139-41, and in 2 A LEGIsLATrvE HISTORY OF THE
COMPRmESIvE ENVMONMENTAL RESPONsE, COMPENSATiON, AND LABmmY ACT oF 1980 (SuEre-
ruii), Puauc LAw 96-510, at 93 (1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF CERCLA] (critiquing
of Superfund proposals by Congressman Gore).
44. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986)
(predicting windfalls for purchasers if liability does not carry over to subsequent purchasers).
45. See id. (predicting such windfalls for lenders at foreclosure sales).
46. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
47. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
48. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
49. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A,B,D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A,B,D) (1988).
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injury, destruction or loss of natural resources. 0 No cap on potential liability
for cleanup costs exists, but CERCLA limits natural resource and punitive
damages to $50 million 1 The defenses to liability set out in the statute are
the only possible defenses to CERCLA liability. 52 Relief from liability requires
proof that the release or threatened release of hazardous material occurred
only because of one of the enumerated statutory defenses: an act of God, an
act of war, or the unforeseeable acts of unrelated third parties.53
Because of the costs associated with the cleanup on hazardous waste sites
and limited defenses to liability available to PRPs, potential liability under
CERCLA is staggering.-4 Lenders holding a security interest in a facility are
exposed to this liability in two ways. First, lenders can become owners of the
facility through foreclosure.5 5 Second, lenders may be responsible for cleanup
through operation of the secured creditor exemption 6 Congress included the
secured creditor exemption within the definition of owner or operator under
CERCLA. 7 The definition of owner or operator provides that persons holding
indicia of ownership as a security interest are not liable as owners so long as
such persons do not participate in management of the site .5 Discovering the
meaning and scope of the secured creditor exemption is essential to lenders
as lenders make future loans or renegotiate old loans. Any discernable meaning
of the secured creditor exemption must be found in the legislative history of
CERCLA and judicial interpretations of the exemption. 9
Any interpretation of CERCLA, as with other federal environmental
legislation, must be guided by considerations of fairness and efficiency 0
Congress considered fairness and efficiency in their discussions leading to the
passage of CERCLA.6' CERCLA is compromise legislation created from four
50. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
51. CERCLA § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1988).
52. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) (providing defenses to CERCLA
liability).
53. Id.
54. See J. ACTON, supra note 36, at 44 (1989) (detailing past cost recovery actions under
CERCLA). The EPA reports successful cost recovery on 328 sites with an average recovery of
$700,000 per site. Id. One hundred and thirty sites from the National Priorities List referred to
the Justice Department for reimbursement action represent a value of $222 million. Id at 42. In
1988 alone 117 settlements for cost recovery totaled $113 million, or almost $1 million per
settlement. Id.
55. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp 573, 577 (D. Md. 1986)
(holding that secured creditor became owner upon taking title at foreclosure sale).
56. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20997 (E.D.
Pa. Sept 4, 1985) (holding that secured creditor may have participated in management to point
of incurring liability), cert. denied Levine v. United States, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985).
57. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (defining owner or operator
for purposes of CERCLA).
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 67-97, 122-97 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and
judicial decisions interpreting secured creditor exemption).
60. See Development in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5, at 1478 (1986)
(describing methods generally used to critique federal environmental programs).
61. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent associated
with CERCLA's liability scheme).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:659
different bills.A Congress simply cut and pasted together many different
provisions from various bills to put together a passable bill.6A CERCLA's
legislative history reveals that Congress recognized an abandoned site hazardous
waste problem in America, but Congress had no empirical evidence of the
magnitude of the problem. 64 At the time Congress debated passage of CER-
CLA, estimates on abandoned sites that could pose a problem for human
health or the environment ranged from hundreds to tens of thousands. 5 The
problem of abandoned sites is much larger than the most expansive estimates
originally anticipated. 66
Two recurring themes in CERCLA's legislative history are pertinent to
lender liability.67 First, throughout CERCLA Congress expressed a keen desire
to make those responsible for pollution pay. 8 Second, Congress intended to
prevent unscrupulous polluters from establishing schemes to escape liability
for cleanup costs.69 Unfortunately, this second goal frequently overwhelms the
first.70 For example, in an effort to close loopholes that polluters could use
to escape liability, Congress imposed liability on a present owner of a facility
liable for response costs even if all incidents of hazardous waste disposal
occurred before the present ownership.7 1 Joint and several liability is another
62. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986)
(describing legislative history and origin of CERCLA).
63. See 1 LEG.sIAnvE HISTORY OF CERCLA, at v-vii (describing evolution of several bills
pending before Congress into bill finally passed as CERCLA).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt.1 at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmw. NEws 6119, 6120, and in 2 LEI . siAvE HisTORY OF CERCLA at 48
(discussing background and need for hazardous waste legislation).
65. See H.R. RE'. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.l at 18-71 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & Anmw. NEws 6119, 6120-47, and in 2 LEisr.ATivE HIsTORY OF CERCLA at
49-102 (reporting House Report on the background and need for hazardous substance legislation
and citing an EPA estimate of 30,000-50,000 hazardous waste sites with 1,200-2,000 of these sites
posing a serious risk to public health). Compare this with the estimate of 851 potentially hazardous
sites made by Congressman Eckhardt's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation. Id. at 71.
Representatives Stockman and Loeffler criticize the EPA estimates as methodologically flawed
because the EPA based its estimates on an extrapolation from 232 actual cases. Id.
66. See J. ACTON, supra note 36, at 25 (discussing number of clean-up sites by stage in
CERCLA process). There are approximately 30,000 sites identified for possible inclusion on the
National Priorities List (NPL). Id. Of these approximately 1200 are included in the NPL. Id.
67. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (describing recurrent themes of CERCLA
legislative history).
68. See H.R. RE'. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 68 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnim. NEws 6119, 6143, and in 2 LEGisi.ATrVE HISTORY OF CERCLA, at
99 (discussing the liability scheme of H.R. 7020).
69. See H.R. RE'. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 62 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AamN. NEws 6119, 6139, and in 2 LEaosATIv HwSrORY OF CERCLA, at
93 (critiquing of Superfund proposals by Congressman Gore).
70. See Dower, supra note 1, at 186-87 (discussing who actually pays for environmental
regulation).
71. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988) (designating present owner or
operator of vessel or facility as potentially responsible party). CERCLA § 101(32) defines liability
by reference to the liability standards of the Clean Water Act (CWA). 42 U.S.C. § 101(32). Based
on this reference to the CWA, courts have applied a standard of strict liability under CERCLA.
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example of Congress' desire to close loopholes overwhelming any concerns
about fairness.72 Although Congress explicitly removed a provision establishing
joint and several liability from the original bill because of a threatened
filibuster, Congress implicitly condoned joint and several liability by reference
in CERCLA's definition of liability to the Clean Water Act and federal
common law.73 Literally, the Justice Department can hold one dry cleaning
operator responsible for all the government's cleanup costs when the dry
cleaner dumped chemicals at a toxic waste site constituting only a negligible
percentage of the total waste at the site 7 4
These two themes found in the legislative history of CERCLA, making
polluters pay for cleanup costs and preventing any loopholes to escape liability,
are important for lenders because these themes entice courts to construe classes
of PRPs very broadly and to construe the exceptions to liability very narrowly.7 5
Courts use these general themes and the deficiency of Congressional discussion
See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding liable present
landowners not involved with improper disposal of hazardous waste); Tanglewood East Hom-
eowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). The Shore Realty court discussed the
legislative history of liability in CERCLA and noted that reference to the CWA was a compromise
to removing explicit mention of strict, joint and several liability. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042.
The Shore Realty court then imposed strict liability based on prior decisions interpreting liability
under the CWA as strict liability. Id.
72. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' treatment of joint and
several liability in passage of CERCLA).
73. CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988) (using CWA standard of liability to
define liability under CBRCLA); see also Grunbaum, supra note 8, at 165 (discussing joint and
several liability under CERCLA). Reacting to a threatened filibuster by Senator Jesse Helms,
Congress deleted references to joint and several liability in CERCLA's liability scheme. Id. Federal
courts first applied joint and several liability under CERCLA in United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The Chem-Dyne court relied on the legislative history
of CERCLA and on federal common law in fashioning a joint and several liability rule under
CERCLA. Id. at 807-08. The rule established is not absolute but follows the common law of
imposing joint and several liability when two or more persons contribute to an indivisible harm.
Id. at 810. Legislative history in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act explicitly
adopts the scheme of strict, joint and several liability established by federal courts. House ENERGY
AND CoMmRCE ComMrrEE REPORT 99-253 To H.R. 2817, 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
AND ADmN. NEws 2835, 2856.
74. See supra note 16 (discussing CERCLA's judicially created joint and several liability
scheme). The provision for de minimis settlements added to CERCLA by SARA provides some
protection for PRPs whose contribution to the hazardous waste problem is minimal in both
amount and effect. See CERCLA § 122(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1988) (directing expedited
settlement of de minimis claims). Section 122(g)(1) of CERCLA directs the EPA to expedite
settlement with PRPs if the settlement involves a minor portion of the total response costs. Id.
The PRP must also fit one of two categories. Id. One category is for the PRP whose contribution
to the total hazardous substances is minimal in both amount and effect. CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A). The second category is for the PRP who owns the real property where
the facility is located, but did not conduct or permit generation or disposal of hazardous waste
at the facility or contribute to the release or threatened release of hazardous waste at the facility.
CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B).
75. See infra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of
secured creditor exemption).
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on creditor liability to decide lender responsibility under the secured creditor
exemption.76 Despite the lack of Congressional discussion on lender liability
the legislative history of CERCLA nonetheless is useful in interpreting the
secured creditor exemption."
Two specific portions of CERCLA's legislative history shed light on
CERCLA's exemption for lenders. 78 The first portion discusses the origin of
the definitions of owner and operator.7 9 Congress apparently drew the current
CERCLA definitions of owner and operator from definitions found in a
proposed bill that was eventually folded into CERCLA, The Comprehensive
Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (Oil
Act). s° The Oil Act's definitions are helpful because CERCLA's definition of
owner or operator is a tautology and CERCLA's definition is not as specific
an the definition found in the Oil Act."1 The Oil Act's definition of owner
specifically explained the parties included and excluded. 2 The Oil Act specif-
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 225-38 and accompanying text (using legislative history to cast light on
meaning of secured creditor exemption).
78. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (setting out significant aspects of legislative
history).
79. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1980) (defining owner or operator
of facility under CERCLA as any person owning or operating such facility). The legislative history
of CERCLA does not specifically discuss the intended meaning of the definition of owner or
operator under CERCLA, but one of the bills that was eventually folded into CERCLA contained
a similar definition of owner or operator and CERCLA's legislative history includes discussion of
the intended meaning of owner or operator under that earlier proposed bill. See H.R. RP. No.
172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADUN. NEws
6160, 6181, and in 2 LEGIsLATVE HISTORY op CERCLA, at 546-47 (elaborating on definitions of
owner or operator in proposed bill H.R. 85 § 101 (x),(y)).
80. Compare CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (defining owner and
operator under CERCLA) with H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 36 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 6160, 6181, and in 2 LEGIs sTIE HIroRY
OF CERCLA, at 546-47 (describing definitions of owner and operator for H.R. 85 § 101 (x),(y)).
The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries favorably recommended H.R. 85 to the 96th
Congress. H.R. REP. No. 172 at 1. The Oil Act bill proposed a "Superfund" and liability scheme
for handling oil pollution at-sea and on-shore. Id. at 15-32. This bill was one of a series of bills
proposed in the 1970's to address the problem of oil pollution. Id.
81. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (providing, "The term
'owner or operator' means ... any person owning or operating such facility.") This definition
of owner or operator adds meaning only in light of those persons it attempts to except, for
example persons included in the secured creditor exemption. See United States v. Mirabile, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envti. L. Inst.) 20992, 20995 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (describing CERCLA's
definition of owner or operator as tautology but for secured creditor exemption), cert. denied
Levine v. United States, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co.,
632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986) (analyzing poor grammatical structure of CERCLA's
definition of owner or operator and characterizing CERCLA generally as patched together
compromise Act). See also infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (describing Oil Act definition
of owner).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6160, 6181 and in 2 LEGisrAn HISrORY oF CERCLA, at 546
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ically defined operators as only those assuming the full range of operational
responsibility, at least so far as vessels are concerned. 3
The second portion of CERCLA's legislative history that is helpful in
examining CERCLA's secured creditor exemption is the liability scheme of
the Oil Act. 4 The Oil Act's proposed liability scheme for owners and operators
was similar to the liability scheme for these same two parties in CERCLA. as
Under the Oil Act, present owners or operators would have been strictly liable
up to a statutory limit. 6 CERCLA's liability scheme for present owners and
operators of a facility also is strict liability, but without a statutory maximum
recovery. 7 The Committee on Public Works and Transportation recommended
amending the Oil Act to exempt from liability owners who lease vessels to
unaffiliated operators from liability 5
Legislative history of the Oil Act is significant for four reasons. 9 First,
Congress apparently drew from the language of the Oil Act in drafting the
(defining owner in Oil Act). According to the legislative history of the Oil Act,
"Owner" is defined to include not only those persons who hold title to a vessel or
facility but those who, in the absence of holding a title, possess some equivalent evidence
of ownership. It does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such
as a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or operation
of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with
a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or regulations.
Id. The definition specifically provides an example of a lender holding title and enjoying tax
benefits from that title as exempt from liability under the Oil Act, so long as the lender did not
participate in the management or operation of the vessel or facility. Id.
83. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & ADmni. NEws 6160, 6181 and in 2 LEmIsLATrVE HSroRY OF CERCLA, at 546.
The Oil Act's definition of operator applies specifically to the operation of vessels. Id. The report
gives the example of a ship pilot. Id. According to the Committee report the pilot is not an
operator because the pilot "neither mans nor supplies the vessel." Id. at 36-37. For a facility, the
Oil Act's definition is no more enlightening than CERCLA's definition of facility in that the Oil
Act defines an operator as "a person who is carrying out operational functions for the owner[.]"
Id. at 37.
84. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (describing liability scheme of Oil Act and
comparing Oil Act's liability scheme to liability scheme of CERCLA).
85. Compare CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988) (establishing liability scheme of
CERCLA) with H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 42-46 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADmx. NEws 6160, 6187-191 and in 2 LnoiLsTrrv HISTORY OF CERCLA,
at 552-56 (detailing liability scheme of Oil Act section by section).
86. See H.R. RP'. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 42-46 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 6160, 6187-191 and in 2 LEGIsLA.rvE H=SoRY oF CERCLA,
at 552-56 (detailing liability scheme of Oil Act section by section).
87. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988) (establishing owners and
operators as PRPs in CERCLA liability scheme); see also id. § 107(c)(1)(D); 42 U.S.C. §
9607(c)(1)(D) (establishing limits on recovery under CERCLA for cleanup response at facilities).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.2 at 2-3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmNss. NEws 6212, 6213 and in 2 LEGISLATrvE HISTORY OF CERCLA, at 615
(describing recommended amendments to Oil Act).
89. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (describing relationship between Oil Act
and CERCLA).
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definitions of owner and operator for CERCLA1 ° Second, unlike CERCLA,
the Oil Act was not a hastily crafted compromise agreement.91 Third, the Oil
Act illustrates the definition of owner and operator at greater length.Y2 The
Oil Act definitions demonstrate an intent by the legislature to hold accountable
those parties actually in control of property.Y Fourth, the legislative intent
found in the Oil Act is important for putting the secured creditor exemption
in context.94 One of the express purposes of the Oil Act was to impose
reasonable and insurable limits of liability.95 Insurance for hazardous waste
liability almost is non-existent.9 Congress's mandate for the EPA to investigate
the state of the hazardous waste insurance industry in CERCLA's reauthori-
zation act, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),
demonstrates legislative concern for the unavailability of hazardous waste
liability insurance.Y
Congress addressed some of the shortcomings in CERCLA's liability
scheme in SARA. 98 The legislative history of SARA is more meticulous and
complete than the legislative history of CERCLA.9 Unfortunately for lenders,
Congress did not address secured creditor liability during CERCLA's reau-
90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (establishing similarities between statutory
definition of owner and operator in CERCLA and definitions of owner and operator proposed
in Oil Act); see also United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D.
Md. 1986) (using Oil Act definitions of owner and operator found in CERCLA's legislative history
to interpret CERCLA's definition of owner and operator); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20996 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 4, 1985) (using discussion of "operator"
from Oil Act found in CERCLA legislative history to interpret CERCLA's definition of owner
and operator), cert. denied Levine v. United States, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985).
91. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 24 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & ADmw. NEws 6160, 6169, and in 2 LEGISATvE HISTORY OF CERCLA, at 528-32
(explaining evolution of Oil Act).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmni. NEws 6160, 6181 and in 2 LEGiSLATVE HISTORY OF CERCLA, at 546
(defining owner and operator under Oil Act).
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of Oil Act).
94. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (relating legislative intent of Oil Act to
CERCLA).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1 at 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 6160, 6168 and in 2 LEGiSiATivE HISTORY OP CERCLA, at 552
(describing purposes of Oil Act).
96. See Dower, supra note 1, at 183-85 (discussing lack of available insurance to cover
hazardous waste liability).
97. See CERCLA § 301(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(b) (1988) (mandating study into availability
of private hazardous waste liability and competition in that industry); see also H.R. REP. No.
253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & ArmIN. NEws
2835, 2891 (discussing insurability study).
98. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text (describing liability issues addressed by
Congress during reauthorization of CERCLA).
99. Compare 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6199-241 (1980)
(compiling legislative history of CERCLA) with 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws, 99th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 2835-3441 (1986) (compiling legislative history of SARA). The compiled legislative
history of SARA is approximately 5 times larger than the compiled legislative history of CERCLA.
Id.
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thorization.100 Some inferences about CERCLA's liability scheme can be made
from the liability issues Congress addressed in SARA.' °" In SARA Congress
expressly adopted the scheme of retroactive, strict, joint, and several liability
developed in the federal courts in the first six years of CERCLA. 10 2 Congress
also directly addressed the issue of liability for municipal governments stem-
ming from response actions or escheat of land.es Consequently, SARA spe-
cifically adopted the judicial gloss added to CERCLA in its first six years and
the amendments clarified an ambiguity about certain liable parties.104 On the
other hand, SARA did not confront directly secured creditor liability. °5
Because SARA did not address the secured creditor exemption or lender
liability generally, some commentators have inferred that Congress accepted
the then current judicial theories on lender liability.1°6 This proposition seems
unlikely because the judicial decisions available for Congress to consider were
federal district court and bankruptcy court opinions, and those decisions did
not present a unified formula for lender liability.0 7 Another explanation for
why Congress did not address lender liability in CERCLA is that because no
lender liability cases rose to the United States Courts of Appeals before the
passage of SARA, Congress did not realize a lender liability problem existed.
The one amendment in SARA that possibly affects lender liability is
Congress' creation of the so-called "innocent landowner" defense.18 To create
the "innocent landowner" defense, Congress modified the third party defense
originally provided in CERCLA. 0 9 The third party defense provides in part
that persons otherwise liable under CERCLA are not liable when a third
party, not under contractual relationship with the potentially responsible party,
100. See 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmw. NEWS, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2835-3441 (1986)
(compiling legislative history of SARA).
101. See infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text (using legislative history of SARA to
interpret CERCLA secured creditor exemption).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 253(), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1986), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2856 (adopting retroactive, joint and several liability for CERCLA).
103. See H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AnroN. News 2835, 2855 (discussing changes to definition of owner and operator in
CERCLA § 101(20)(D) and state responsibility for response actions under CERCLA § 107(d)(2)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section
10(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 926 n.14 (1989) (putting forth proposition that
Congress's silence on lender liability in SARA is significant); see also, Guidice v. BFG Electroplating
and Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (opining that lenders are included in
CERCLA's liability scheme because Congress did not specifically address lender liability in SARA).
107. See infra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (describing judicial decisions interpreting
CERCLA's secured creditor exemption).
108. See H.R. Corp. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 3276, 3279 (introducing innocent landowner defense).
109. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (defining contractual
relationship as applied in CERCLA § 107 to exclude from liability persons taking possession of
property after conclusion of all hazardous substance disposal or placement if party taking possession
did not know or should not have reasonably known of hazardous substance disposal or placement
on property).
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causes the release or threatened release of hazardous materials." 0 Congress
altered the definition of "contractual relationship" to provide a defense for
landowners who unknowingly purchase contaminated land."' Prospective pur-
chasers, however, must exercise due diligence in investigating possible environ-
mental problems before purchase and reasonable care in handling any discovered
toxic substances.12 For example, the innocent landowner defense may apply
to lenders when they acquire property through foreclosure if the lender exercises
due diligence before assuming ownership of the property."3 Congress's creation
of the innocent landowner defense mutes CERCLA's harsh scheme of strict,
joint and several liability with an element of concern for the culpability of
the parties involved." 4 As a well documented part of the legislative history of
CERCLA's liability scheme, Congress' demonstrated concern for fairness and
equity in creating the innocent landowner defense can be used in interpreting
the secured creditor exemption." 5
Creditors holding a security interest in either the real property or equipment
of a business may become liable for the hazardous waste disposal practices
of the business as either an owner or an operator of the business." 6 In the
definition of owner or operator, CERCLA exempts persons holding indicia
of ownership primarily to protect a security interest, if the person refrains
from participating in the management of the facility." 7 When the lender
forecloses, thereby becoming the actual owner of the foreclosed property, the
innocent landowner defense nonetheless may protect the lender from liability."'
CERCLA treats a lender taking possession of property in which the lender
previously held a security interest no differently than any other purchaser of
property."9 The issue of liability becomes less clear cut for lenders holding a
security interest who have not foreclosed.1' ° Very few cases addressing the
secured creditor exemption emerged in the first ten years of CERCLA en-
forcement actions and the decided cases did not present a unified approach
to lender liability.'
2'
110. See CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988) (describing third party defense
to CERCLA liability).
111. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
112. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988).
113. See CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988) (describing requirements for
asserting innocent landowner defense).
114. See supra note 109 (describing Congress' intent in establishing innocent landowner
defense).
115. Id.
116. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988) (describing owners and operators
as PRPs); Id. § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (defining owner and operator under CERCLA).
117. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
118. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (defining contractual
relationship under CERCLA).
119. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D. Md.
1986) (holding foreclosing lender liable as present owner).
120. See infra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (describing various judicial interpretations
given secured creditor exemption).
121. Id.
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The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio
first confronted the problem of interpreting the secured creditor exemption.'"
In In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.'2, a vandal released hazardous chemicals
on the property of the bankrupt T.P. Long Chemical Company, Inc.'2 The
EPA determined the release warranted immediate action and performed a
cleanup.Y2 During the cleanup the agency discovered drums of hazardous
chemicals, unknown to anyone except Mr. Long, buried at the rear of the
Long Company's property.126 BancOhio held a perfected security interest in
the accounts receivable, equipment, fixtures, inventory, and other personal
property of T.P. Long Chemical Co.l 27 The Bankruptcy court found as a
matter of fact that BancOhio's security interest included these drums.'2 In
the EPA's reimbursement claim for administrative expenses before the Bank-
ruptcy court, the agency argued that BancOhio received a benefit when the
cleanup removed the drums, implying that BancOhio's security interest in the
drums made BancOhio an owner or operator of a facility under the CERCLA
definitions.'19 The court considered the secured creditor exemption of CERCLA
and declared that BancOhio was not an owner or operator as defined by the
statute. 1'0 The court reasoned that merely because a creditor possesses a security
interest in the debtor's property the secured creditor does not necessarily have
to take possession of the property.' If secured property becomes a liability
122. See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 282-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(addressing meaning of secured creditor exemption).
123. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
124. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). The
T.P. Long Chemical Company operated a rubber recycling plant at the vandalized site. Id. at
280. At the time the vandalism occurred a trustee was administering the estate of T.P. Long
Chemical Company under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 281. Following a sale of
personal property from the Long Company's estate by BancOhio (a secured creditor), an acquain-
tance of the purchaser opened the valve on a tank containing sulfur monochloride, a hazardous
substance as defined by CERCLA § 101(14). Id.
125. Id. at 281. The EPA first requested the bankruptcy trustee to take action. Id. After the
trustee refused to comply with the EPA's cleanup request, the agency initiated a cleanup of the
Long Company site. Id. During the cleanup, the agency discovered approximately 90 drums of
hazardous material buried on the Long Company's property. Id.
126. Id. at 281. Mr. Long owned all corporate stock of T.P. Long Chemical Co. and served
as the company's operating officer. Id. at 280.
127. Id. at 280.
128. See id. at 281 (detailing court's findings of fact). In T.P. Long, the court held as a
matter of fact that BancOhio held a perfected security interest in the accounts receivable, equipment,
fixtures, inventory, and other personal property of the T.P. Long Chemical Co. and that the
estate of T.P. Long Chemical Company included the drums buried on the Long site. Id. at 280.
The court did not explain why the buried drums, which were discovered after the bankruptcy
trustee's auction, were part of BancOhio's perfected security interest. See id. at 280-81 (detailing
court's findings of fact).
129. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
130. Id.
131. Id. The EPA argued that BancOhio should not be allowed to sell part of its collateral
for a benefit while abandoning that part of the collateral which was a liability. Id. The court
disagreed with the EPA, holding that creditors are not insurers, responsible for collateral that
poses a public risk. Id.
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or becomes worthless to the creditor, the creditor can abandon the property. 3 2
The creditor's only risk is that the value of the secured loan will not be
covered when the debtor defaults.' The court went so far as to find that
even if BancOhio had repossessed the property, the repossession would not
subject BancOhio to CERCLA liability because BancOhio did not participate
in the management of the Long facility and repossession would be an act to
protect the bank's security interest.'3
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in United States v. Mirabie,3 5 was the next court to address the secured
creditor exemption. 36 Application of the secured creditor exemption in Mirabile
involved two banks, American Bank and Trust Company of Pennsylvania
(ABT) and Mellon Bank National Association (Mellon), and one government
agency, the Small Business Administration (SBA). 3 7 ABT, Mellon and the
SBA each independently provided financing for a paint manufacturing business
known as Turco Coatings, Inc. (Turco).35 ABT held a mortgage on the Turco
site, Mellon held a security interest in the inventory and assets of Turco, and
the SBA held second liens on Turco's inventory, equipment, and accounts
receivable, as well as a second mortgage on Turco's real property.
3 9
After reviewing the secured creditor exemption in CERCLA's definition
of owner and operator, the Mirabile court established involvement by the
secured creditor in the day-to-day operation of the debtor as the requisite test
for determining application of the CERCLA secured creditor exemption.
40
Based on this test the Mirabile court determined as a matter of law that
ABT's actions did not constitute participation in the management of Turco,
despite ABT's foreclosure and subsequent purchase of the Turco site at a
132. Id.
133. Id. at 288.
134. See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(discussing BancOhio's status as an owner or operator of the facility as defined by CERCLA and
specifically applying secured creditor exemption).
135. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
136. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20994 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985).
137. Id. at 20994.
138. Id. at 20995. In Mirabile, the EPA sued the Mirabile's as present owners of the Turco
site to recover costs of a cleanup performed at the site. Id. at 20994. The Mirabiles joined ABT
and Mellon as third party defendants. Id. at 20995. ABT and Mellon impleaded the SBA on a
claim that procedures associated with the SBA financing of Turco contributed to the hazardous
waste problem. Id.
139. Id. at 20996.
140. Id. at 20996. In Mirabile, the court noted that absent the secured creditor exemption,
CERCLA's definition of owner and operator is a hopeless tautology. Id. at 20995. According to
the court, the plain meaning of the exemption must be that so long as secured creditors do not
become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owners or operators, the creditors are not
liable under CERCLA. Id. From this proposition the day-to-day operations test emerged. Id. at
20996. The Mirabile court recognized that the problem posed is how far a secured creditor may
go in interacting with the business before the creditor becomes an owner or operator. Id. at 20995.
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sheriff's sale.'14 In addition, the Mirabile court held that ABT's foreclosure
did not make ABT an owner as defined by CERCLA because ABT foreclosed
solely to protect a security interest. 42 The SBA's loan documents put restric-
tions on Turco's finances and allowed for significant involvement by the SBA
in the management of Turco.143 The court held that a creditor's financial
restrictions on a debtor did not constitute participation in management under
CERCLA.'" Finally, the court refused to rule as a matter of law on application
of the secured creditor exemption to Mellon because the Mirabiles presented
some evidence of Mellon's involvement in managing Turco's business.
145
The United States District Court for Maryland in United States v. Mar-
yland Bank and Trust Company,'46 the next case requiring interpretation of
the secured creditor exemption, refused to follow the Mirabile decision's day-
141. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20996 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985). ABT's interaction with Turco was exceptionally circumscribed. Id. ABT foreclosed
on Turco's real property and was subsequently the highest bidder at the sheriff's auction. Id.
ABT never actually took the sheriff's deed to the land. Id. Instead ABT found a purchaser (the
Mirabiles) and assigned the bid to them. Id. In the three months between the sheriff's auction
and assignment to the Mirabiles, ABT limited its actions at the Turco site to: 1) securing the
property against vandalism, 2) getting estimates on the cost of disposal of various drums on the
property, and 3) showing the property to prospective buyers. Id. All of these actions took place
after Turco completed operations. Id. As a defense to CERCLA liability, ABT claimed the
sheriff's sale gave ABT equitable title but not legal title. Id. Reasoning from this lack of legal
title, ABT disclaimed ownership of the Turco site. Id. The court held the distinction moot because
ABT acted solely to protect a security interest. Id. Later courts have criticized and refused to
follow the reasoning concerning ABT's ownership in Mirabile. See United States v. Maryland
Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986) (disagreeing with reasoning in Mirabile);
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing and
rejecting reasoning of day-to-day operations test in Mirabile), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
142. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)
(discussing court's reasons for granting summary judgement to ABT).
143. Id. In Mirabile, the loan agreement between Turco and the SBA gave the SBA broad
power to control Turco's operations. Id. The agreement put restrictions on Turco's financial
dealings, gave the SBA a right to veto any contracts for management consultants, and required
the SBA to provide management assistance to Turco. Id. The court held these provisions did not
make the SBA liable because no evidence was presented to show the SBA exercised any of the
powers over Turco. Id. at 20996-97.
144. See id. at 20997 (discussing liability of SBA under secured creditor exemption of
CERCLA). The court in Mirabile noted that the language in the SBA's loan agreement giving the
SBA power to participate in the management of Turco did not create liability under CERCLA
because the Mirabiles did not offer any proof that the SBA ever exercised any of the powers to
participate allowed in the loan agreement. Id.
145. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20997 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985). Mellon's possible liability stems from the actions of Mellon's predecessor-in-interest,
Girard Bank. Id. at 20996. After establishing a financing agreement with Turco, Girard placed
one of the bank's loan officers on the Advisory Board established to oversee Turco's operations
Id. Witnesses testified that bank representatives were always on the Turco site, making demands
for increased sales and insisting on particular manufacturing changes as well as personnel reas-
signments. Id. at 20997. Even in light of this testimony, the court characterized the Mirabile's
case for holding Mellon liable as a slender reed. Id.
146. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:659
to-day operations test. 47 The EPA filed suit against Maryland Bank and Trust
(MBT) as the present owner of property on which EPA performed a hazardous
waste cleanup."'5 MBT became the owner of the site after foreclosing on a
mortgage of the property. 149 MBT took title to the property (known as the
California Maryland Drum site or CMD site) over a year before the EPA
initiated cleanup of the sit6 and remained the owner several years later when
the EPA filed suit.I50
MBT argued that the reasoning applied to exempt ABT from liability in
Mirabile should apply to MBT's situation because MBT foreclosed to protect
a security interest.' The Maryland Bank and Trust court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that to fall within the exemption the security interest must
exist at the time of the cleanup.5 2 According to the court, the length of time
MBT held the property after foreclosure precluded application of the Mirabile
court's reasoning used to exempt ABT.'53 The Maryland Bank and Trust court
distinguished Mirabile because of the difference in time of possession, then
147. United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986)
(refusing to follow Mirabile).
148. Id. at 575-76.
149. Id. at 575. In Maryland Bank, MBT had a business relationship with the previous two
owners of the CMD site dating back to at least some time in the 1970's. Id. Hershel and Nelle
McLeod owned the property from 1944 until their son purchased the property from them in 1980.
Id. MBT knew that the senior McLeod's used the property as a trash and garbage dump site. Id.
There was no proof that MBT knew of the McLeod's use of the site for hazardous wastes. Id.
The son, Mark McLeod, purchased the site with a loan from MBT. Id. He soon defaulted and
MBT foreclosed, eventually becoming the owner of the property. Id. Approximately a year after
the foreclosure sale, Mark McLeod reported the existence of hazardous waste site to local health
authorities. Id.
150. Id. at 575. In Maryland Bank, the EPA requested that MBT perform the cleanup before
the EPA took any remedial action. Id. The EPA performed the cleanup only after MBT refused
to act. Id.
151. See id. at 578 (outlining MBT's argument); supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text
(establishing Mirabile court's reasoning in absolving ABT from liability).
152. United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
While the holding in Maryland Bank and Trust adds little to the meaning of CERCLA's secured
creditor exemption, the court's discussion of the exemption points out the poor drafting of
CERCLA's liability scheme and some ambiguities in the statute. See id. at 577-80 (parsing
CERCLA's secured creditor exemption). The Maryland Bank court starts by asking whether one
must be an owner, an operator, or both owner and operator. Id. at 577. The ambiguity arises
because CERCLA is inconsistent in linking the words owner and operator. Id. at 577-78. CERCLA
§ 107(a)(1) holds "the owner and operator" of a facility liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
Correct grammar requires the article "the" before operator to read the phrase in the disjunctive.
Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 578. The court looks to the legislative history to
clear up this ambiguity. See id. at 578 (discussing legislative history of definition of operator).
The court refers to CERCLA as a "hastily patched together compromise" and to the legislative
history as "sparse." Id. at 578. Additionally, the court resolves the issue of MBT's liability by
using a strained verb tense analysis of CERCLA § 101(20)(A) (the secured creditor exemption).
See id. at 579 (discussing verb tense of exemption). This is a classic case of the court choking on
a gnat while swallowing a camel, considering that MBT owned the property for over a year before
the EPA took remedial action and the fact that MBT paid $46,500 more than the loan value of
the property at the foreclosure sale. See id. at 575 (describing MBT's purchase).
153. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579 n.5.
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went on in dicta to disagree with the Mirabile court's interpretation of
CERCLA's secured creditor exemption.1 4 The court's reasoning behind finding
MBT an owner directly contradicts the holding of Mirabile, but the Maryland
Bank and Trust opinion has qualifying language about the relatively long
length of time MBT held the property as owner. 55 After labeling MBT an
owner the court turned to application of the third party defense, known as
the innocent landowner defense after the passage of SARA. 56 The court denied
the government's summary judgement motion as to the third party defense
because of unresolved issues of material fact concerning MBT's relationship
with former owners of the site and the bank's use of reasonable care at the
site since purchase of the property.' 7
Ultimately, the Maryland Bank and Trust case does not fit easily into the
secured creditor scheme because of the court's qualifying language. Although
the decisions interpreting the secured creditor exemption prior to and including
Maryland Bank and Trust do not draw a bright line for creditors, the decisions
do provide a common-sense approach for holding lenders liable.' In Maryland
Bank and Trust, MBT foreclosed on contaminated property and held it for
four years. 15 9 MBT, therefore, became an owner of the property just as any
other purchaser at a foreclosure sale.160 On the opposite end of the spectrum
is Mirabile, where the lender, ABT, foreclosed but was not held liable because
the lender took a hands-off approach to the property and limited its activity
to that necessary to realize on its security interest. 61 The two federal district
courts that have ruled on the secured creditor exemption since Maryland Bank
and Trust have drawn from the holdings in both Mirabile and Maryland Bank
and Trust.162
154. See id. at 580 (disagreeing with holding in Mirabile that secured creditor may foreclose
in some instances without incurring liability as owner under CERCLA).
155. Id. at 579.
156. United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co. 632 F. Supp. 573, 581 (D. Ma. 1986).
157. Id. In Maryland Bank, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
held that the record was not developed enough to rule on issues concerning the contractual
relationship between MBT and Hershel McLeod, Sr., the owner of the property during the time
that hazardous waste was deposited on the property. Id. at 581. The court also held that questions
remained as to the reasonableness of MBT's conduct concerning the bank's relationship with the
senior McLeod and concerning the reasonableness of MBT's conduct with respect to the site. Id.
These unresolved questions prevented the court from granting the government's summary judgement
motion challenging MBT's use of the innocent landowner defense. Id.
158. See supra notes 122-57 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial use of secured creditor
exemption prior to Maryland Bank).
159. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Md.
1986) (describing MBT's purchase of CMD site).
160. See id. at 577 (discussing MBT as an owner).
161. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20996 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (discussing ABT's relationship to Turco property).
162. See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-63 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (adopting the Mirabile test for pre-foreclosure and the Maryland Bank and Trust test for
post-foreclosure); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988)
(adopting the Mirabile test), aff'd on other grounds, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert denied,
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The problem of interpreting the secured creditor exemption reached the
federal appellate level in 1990 when the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit addressed the secured creditor exemption in United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp.'s In Fleet Factors, Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet)
held security interests in the accounts receivable, the plant and equipment and
the real property of Swainsboro Paint Works (SPW).64 After SPW became
bankrupt, Fleet foreclosed on some of SPW's inventory and equipment and
contracted for an auction. 6' Fleet allegedly contracted with a third party, Nix,
to remove the unsold equipment in consideration for cleaning up the site after
the removal. 66 Approximately eighteen months after the auction, but only one
month after Nix left the site for the last time, the EPA discovered hazardous
materials on the site. 67 Fleet never foreclosed on the real property. 168 At a
foreclosure sale caused by SPW's failure to pay state and county taxes, the
county took possession the SPW facility.1 69
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
originally heard the Fleet Factors case.17 0 Drawing from the holding in Mirabile,
the district court applied a day-to-day operations test to determine Fleet's
liability as a secured creditor.' 7' Recognizing the considerable doubt surround-
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). Guidice involved a private enforcement action by borough residents against
a local electroplating company (BFG). Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 557. BFG joined National Bank
of the Commonwealth (the Bank) as a third-party defendant on the theory that the Bank was a
previous owner of adjacent property that contributed to the hazardous waste problem. Id. The
Bank had a long-standing financial relationship with Berlin Metal Polishers (Berlin), the previous
owners of the property adjacent to BFG's property. Id. at 558. In the early 1980's the Bank
increasingly became involved with Berlin's business because of Berlin's financial difficulties. Id. at
558-59. In addition to providing assistance with Berlin's financial management, the Bank became
involved with getting Berlin a permit to discharge into the local sewer system. Id. When workout
efforts failed, the Bank foreclosed on the Berlin property and subsequently purchased the property
at the sheriffs sale. Id. at 559. The Bank held title to the property for approximately nine months.
Id. In ruling on the Bank's liability for cleanup costs, the court used the day-to-day operations
test from Mirabile to determine the Bank's liability prior to foreclosure. Id. at 561. The court,
following the reasoning of Maryland Bank and Trust, held the Bank liable as an owner after the
Bank foreclosed on the Berlin property. Id. at 563.
163. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
164. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (1lth Cir. 1990) (discussing
Fleet's various security agreements), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 752 (1991). According to the agreement,
Fleet advanced funds to SPW against the assignment of SPW's accounts receivable in a factoring
agreement. Id. The relationship between Fleet and SPW continued with court approval after SPW
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id.
165. Id. at 1552.
166. Id. at 1553.
167. Id. at 1553. The EPA found 700 fifty-five gallon drums of toxic chemicals and forty-
four truckloads of asbestos-laden material at the SPW site. Id. Response costs approached $400,000.
Id.
168. Id. at 1553.
169. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
170. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd on other
grounds, 901 F.2d. 1550 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
171. Id. at 960. Using the day-to-day operations test from Mirabile, the District Court ruled
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ing interpretation of the secured creditor exemption, the district court certified
the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on
interlocutory appeal. 17
The Eleventh Circuit flatly refused to adopt the day-to-day management
test.173 Instead, the court announced that secured creditors incur liability under
CERCLA when the creditor's involvement with the business supports an
inference that the lender could influence the debtor's hazardous waste disposal
decisions. 174 The Eleventh Circuit claimed support for its interpretation from
the legislative history of CERCLA and from the overall remedial goals of
CERCLA.175 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the government alleged suf-
ficient facts to hold Fleet accountable as an operator after Fleet's foreclosure
on SPW's property.1 76 Because the court could have held Fleet liable as an
operator without interpreting the secured creditor exemption, the most contro-
versial aspects of the holding in Fleet Factors are dicta.
1"
A difficulty with the Eleventh Circuit's "inference" rule established in
Fleet Factors is in determining what lender activity gives rise to CERCLA
liability.17 8 According to the Eleventh Circuit, monitoring of any aspect of the
debtor's business should not expose the creditor to CERCLA liability.179
Additionally, involvement in discrete and occasional financial decisions of the
debtor should not create CERCLA liability for the creditor if the decisions
involve protection of the creditor's security interest.1w These examples do not
that Fleet was not an operator from the time of its original involvement until the time of the
auction. Id. The court would not rule as a matter of law on Fleet's status from the auction to
the time Nix left. Id. at 961. The court recognized the questions surrounding the court's
interpretation of the secured creditor exemption and certified these questions for interlocutory
appeal before the case preceded. Id. at 962.
172. Id. at 962.
173. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
174. Id. at 1558.
175. Id. at 1557-58. The Eleventh Circuit cites comments made by Representative Harsha
when the Representative introduced the secured creditor exemption to the Senate version of the
bill. Id. at 1558 n.11. According to the Eleventh Circuit, Representative Harsha felt the exemption
was necessary to remove liability from those holding title but not participating in operation or
management or otherwise affiliated with the operators. Id. The court held that a person may be
affiliated with a much more peripheral involvement than being an operator requires. See id.
(discussing court's interpretation of Representative Harsha's remarks in legislative history). Addi-
tionally, the Eleventh Circuit made plain its belief that increased involvement by secured creditors
in the affairs of debtors is a goal of CERCLA and that the court's narrow interpretation of the
secured creditor exemption accomplishes that goal. See id. at 1558 (describing Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of public policy behind passage of CERCLA). Representative Harsha's remarks are
discussed earlier in this note along with other salient points from the legislative history. See supra
notes 61-115 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of CERCLA and SARA).
176. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
177. See id. at 1559 (discussing facts alleged by government in Fleet Factors).
178. See id. at 1558 (discussing application of the Fleet Factors court's "inference" test).
179. Id.
180. See United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (lth Cir. 1990) (discussing
application of the Fleet Factors court's "inference" test), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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tell the secured creditor what actions will result in liability under the secured
creditor exemption of CERCLA. 8 ' The effect of the Fleet Factors decision is
to create a separate class of liable parties that are neither owners nor operators,
but are secured creditors unfortunate enough to have participated in the
debtor's business to a level that supports an inference that the creditor could
influence hazardous waste disposal decisions.' a
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp.,' decided the most recent case interpreting the secured creditor
exemption.'?4 The Port of St. Helens, an Oregon municipal corporation, issued
revenue bonds to support development of a lead recycling plant in St. Helens,
Oregon.Is 5 Through a series of transactions, the municipality acquired title to
the recycling center's building and land.1ss The plant experienced financial
difficulties soon after commencing operation and eventually ended up in
involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' Prior to the filing of the involuntary
bankruptcy petition, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality dis-
covered hazardous waste contamination in the plant.' The bank holding the
revenue bonds sued the parent company of the lead recycler (EAC).'93 The
plaintiff's suit included a request for a declaratioxf that EAC was liable for
environmental cleanup costs. 90 Bergsoe's parent company filed a third-party
complaint against the Port and the bank, alleging that the Port and the bank
were owners as defined by CERCLA.' 91
The Ninth Circuit found the Port was not an owner or operator under
CERCLA. 92 First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the Port held
title, the lease back to the lead recycling company (Bergsoe) gave Bergsoe all
traditional indicia of ownership. 93 The Port merely held title as security on
the bonds. 94 Second, the court found that the Port did not participate at all
in the management of the lead recycling plant. 95 The Ninth Circuit specifically
181. See id. (discussing Fleet Factors court's "inference" test).
182. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit at 7, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991) (arguing that
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fleet Factors creates a new class of liable party not intended by
Congress), denying cert. to, 901 F.2d. 1550 (lth Cir. 1990).
183. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
184. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
185. Id. at 669.
186. Id. at 669-70. The Port sold Bergsoe 50 acres of land on which to construct the recycling
plant in consideration of a promissory note and a mortgage on the property. Id at 669. Bergsoe
conveyed a warranty deed on the property and facilities to the Port in exchange for leases on the
property and facilities. Id. at 670.
187. Id. at 670.
188. Id.
189. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1990).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 673.
193. Id. at 671.
194. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990).
195. Id. at 672-73.
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reserved the question of how much a secured creditor must participate in
management of the debtor before triggering CERCLA liability. 19 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit proclaimed accord with the Fleet Factors decision by finding no
participation in management by the Port.19
The Fleet Factors case currently stands as the only appellate case inter-
preting the nature and extent of the secured creditor exemption under CER-
CLA.' 98 As the Fleet Factors decision disposes of and generally ignores all
previous attempts to define the secured creditor exemption, the decision
deserves careful scrutiny to determine whether it correctly applies the exemp-
tion.199
Any attempt to reconcile the Fleet Factors decision with the CERCLA
statute must start with an examination of the wording of the secured creditor
exemption.? The language of CERCLA indicates that Congress intended the
exemption to have some meaning. 20' This intended meaning applies to the
definitions of liable parties as a whole, not just to the words of the exemp-
tion. The secured creditor exemption can be divided into three distinct
parts.2 Part one requires that the creditor must hold indicia of ownership.?
Part two requires that the creditor must hold the indicia primarily to protect
his security interest.? Part three requires that the lender must hold the indicia
without participating in the management of the facility.206 The problem with
these three parts is that they have no plain meaning when read out of context
with the entire liability scheme.? Putting the words back into an overall
context of owner and operator liability only magnifies the ambiguity, especially
as to what constitutes participation in management.? Past and present owners
are liable.209 Likewise, past and present operators are liable. 210 The secured
196. Id. at 672.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions involving
CERCLA's secured creditor exemption).
199. See infra notes 200-38 and accompanying text (discussing Fleet Factors in light of
CERCLA's legislative history and statutory construction of CERCLA).
200. See infra notes 201-11 and accompanying text (discussing plain meaning of CERCLA's
secured creditor exemption).
201. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986)
(rejecting particular construction of definition of owner and operator that renders CERCLA §
9607(a)(1) useless).
202. See infra notes 203-11 and accompanying text (discussing plain meaning of statute).
203. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (defining owner, operator




207. See supra notes 122-97 and accompanying texts (describing various courts attempts to
give meaning to secured creditor exemption).
208. See id. (describing various courts attempts to give meaning to secured creditor exemption).
209. CERCLA § 107(a)-(b); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b) (1988).
210. Id.
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creditor exemption is a hybrid, dealing with aspects of both operation (ie.
management) and ownership (ie. indicia).
211
In Mirabile, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania resolved the ambiguity in CERCLA's definition of owner or
operator by defining the issue as whether a secured creditor's actions rise to
those of an owner or operator.2 1 2 The Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors rejected
this analysis on the ground that the day-to-day participation in management
test violated the plain meaning of the statute. 211 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit
framed the issue to be whether the lender participated in management of the
facility enough to support the inference that the lender could influence
hazardous waste disposal decisions.
214
The Fleet Factors rule is one of inclusion vice exclusion.2 5 The holding
in Fleet Factors demonstrates that secured creditors are better off without the
secured creditor exemption. 2 6 Without the secured creditor exemption, the
lender's involvement must rise to the level of an owner or operator as defined
by CERCLA.2 7 The court in Fleet Factors specifically held that during the
period of the debtor SPW's bankruptcy and before Fleet's foreclosure, Fleet
was not an owner or an operator of the facility despite holding indicia of
ownership.2 18 The Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors also adopted the lower
court's ruling that Fleet was not liable for response costs because of partici-
pation in management before the bankruptcy even though the trial court
analyzed this period using the day-to-day participation test used in Mirabile.
21 9
The effect of the Eleventh Circuit's holdings is that the secured creditor, Fleet,
did not fit the definition of either an owner or an operator and, therefore,
either some additional category of liability must exist on which to premise
Fleet's liability or Fleet must have become an owner or operator after
foreclosure.220 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the secured creditor exemp-
tion creates this additional category of liability.Y2'
211. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (establishing secured creditor
exemption).
212. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20996 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (establishing day-to-day operation test).
213. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing
and rejecting day-to-day operations test from Mirabile), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
214. See id. at 1558 (establishing "inference" test for secured creditor exemption).
215. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (describing effect of holding in Fleet Factors).
216. See supra notes 163-82 and accompanying text (outlining holding of Eleventh Circuit in
Fleet Factors).
217. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (reasoning that Fleet does on fit under
CERCLA definitions of either owner or operator); see also CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(A) (defining owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA liability).
218. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp, 901 F.2d 1550, 1555 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
219. Id. at 1557.




The rule in Fleet Factors, that secured creditors involved in management
enough to support an inference of influencing hazardous waste disposal are
liable for cleanup costs, is beyond the plain meaning of the statute because
the statute purports to provide an exclusion from liability.m This rule creates
a new class of liable parties that are neither owners nor operators.22 Phrased
as an exception, the plain meaning of the statute does not support the rule
in Fleet Factors.22
Likewise, CERCLA's scant legislative history does not support the Fleet
Factors rule."m The Eleventh Circuit anchored its rule with a passage from
Representative Harsha's introduction of the secured creditor exemption.? 6
Support for the rule turns on Representative Harsha's use of the word
"affiliated," which the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors claimed allows liability
to attach to creditors based on a more attenuated connection than participation
in the day-to-day decision making of a debtor.27 Another interpretation is
that Representative Harsha picked up the word "affiliated" from a proposed
amendment to the Oil Act.m The House introduced the proposed Oil Act
amendment containing the word "affiliated" to deal with shipping fleet
arrangements. m According to the legislative history of CERCLA concerning
the proposed Oil Act, the proposed amendment defined "affiliated" to mean
a relationship in which a person owns, is owned by, or is under common
control with another person."? 0 Therefore, the word affiliated as used in
CERCLA's legislative history demonstrates a very strong degree of connection
between parties, exactly the opposite of the meaning assigned to "affiliated"
by the Eleventh Circuit.?'
222. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text (discussing problems with logic of Fleet
Factors holding).
223. See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text (discussing logic of Fleet Factors "infer-
ence" test).
224. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing that plain meaning of statute
does not support rule in Fleet Factors).
225. See supra notes 67-96 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of CERCLA).
226. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.11 (11th Cir 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
227. Id. at 1558.
228. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of definition
of owner or operator in CERCLA).
229. See H.R. RaP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2-3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & ADmN. NEws 6212, 6213, and in 2 LEGMsLATivE HIsTORY OF CERCLA, at 615
(describing proposed amendments to definition of owner in Oil Act).
230. See id. (describing proposed amendments to definition of owner in Oil Act). The
Committee on Public Works and Transportation recommended amending the Oil Acts definition
of owner to exclude from liability an owner/lessor constructing a vessel to the specifications of a
lessee, if the owner/lessor did not exercise control over the operation or maintenance of the vessel
and was not an affiliate of the lessee. Id.
231. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing CERCLA's legislative history for proposition that "affiliated" clearly indicates more
peripheral degree of involvement with affairs of facility than that necessary to be held liable as
operator.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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The interpretation of CERCLA's legislative history in the Maryland Bank
and Trust decision is more plausible than that of the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation in Fleet Factors. 2 According to the United States District Court
for Maryland, Congress created the secured creditor exemption to avoid holding
mortgagees liable under the common law theory of mortgages.23 Under the
law of thirteen title theory states, the mortgagee holds actual title to property
so long as the mortgage is in force.?
Using the logic from the legislative history discussed in Maryland Bank
and Trust, construction of the secured creditor exemption is as follows:
mortgagees are nominal owners in title theory states; title holders are owners
and are liable under CERCLA's definition of owner or operator; Congress
added the secured creditor exemption to the definition of owner or operator
to prevent including nominal owners such as mortgagees in CERCLA's liability
scheme, provided that the mortgagee did no more than hold a title as a
security interest.2us The above construction of the secured creditor exemption
gives a plain meaning to the statute and supports the exemption as an exclusion
from liability for a particular class of persons who might otherwise fit the
CERCLA definition of owner.2?6 The above construction also supports a
Congressional intent to exclude lenders generally, except those lenders partic-
ipating in the management of the facility.? 7 The "inference" rule from Fleet
Factors operates from the opposite assumption, holding that CERCLA's
liability scheme generally includes lenders and exempts only lenders who can
prove an absence of participation in management of the facility.28
The plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history of CERCLA
are not the only tools available to give meaning to the secured creditor
232. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (comparing holding in Maryland Bank
and Trust with legislative history of CERCLA).
233. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986)
(discussing legislative history of CERCLA); see also J. Mosiowrrz, ENvrmoNmENTAL LIasny
ANm REAL PaOPRTrv TRANSACTONS 79-80 (1989) (discussing Congressional intent in creating secured
creditor exemption as being intended to exempt common law mortgagees). At common law a
mortgage vests ownership in the mortgagee subject to an equity of redemption in the mortgagor.
Id. at 79. The EPA asserted in a brief filed in United States v. Nicolet, Inc. that foreclosure
merely eliminates the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Id. Moskowitz contends that the secured
creditor exemption is designed to exclude common law mortgagees from CERCLA liability and
foreclose assertions such as the one presented by the EPA in Nicolet. Id.
234. See Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579 (discussing application of secured
creditor exemption to common law mortgagees).
235. See id. (determining Congressional intent in drafting secured creditor exemption from
legislative history).
236. See supra text accompanying note 235 (using construction in Maryland Bank and Trust
to interpret secured creditor exemption).
237. See supra text accompanying note 235 (extrapolating from reading of legislative history
of CERCLA in Maryland Bank and Trust holding).
238. See Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous
Waste Cleanup, 38 HAsTiN.s L.J. 1261, 1285-86 (1987) (stating premise that while all persons
holding indicia of ownership are potentially liable, Congress excepted only few).
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exemption. 9 Another method of interpreting the secured creditor exemption
language of CERCLA is to compare the exemption with other portions of the
statute and with other environmental legislation. The outcome of this
comparison is a demonstration that secured creditors as a class are not similar
enough to other liable classes that they should carry the burden of hazardous
waste cleanup.ul
The comparison involves two steps in analyzing the meaning of the secured
creditor exemption u 2 The first step is to look at CERCLA's internal liability
scheme.32 CERCLA section 9607 defines the classes of potentially responsible
parties (PRPs).2 PRPs include generators, transporters, owners and opera-
tors.25 To effectuate the overwhelming remedial goals of CERCLA,2 courts
have construed liability as strict, joint, several, and retroactive.2 7 Based on
this liability scheme, persons contributing hazardous waste at a site may have
to answer in full for the cleanup of the site, no matter how remote in time,
minimal in percentage contribution, and free of negligence the party might
be.?
Based on CERCLA's scheme of strict, joint, several and retroactive
liability, fairness plays no part in defining the limits of CERCLA's liability
schemem 9 Instead, the overarching goal of CERCLA is to clean up hazardous
239. See infra notes 240-62 and accompanying text (discussing additional methods of providing
meaning to secured creditor exemption).
240. See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text (using complete CERCLA scheme and
scheme of other environmental regulation to add meaning to secured creditor exemption).
241. See id. (using complete CERCLA scheme and scheme of other environmental regulation
to add meaning to secured creditor exemption).
242. See infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text (describing two step analysis for analyze
secured creditor exemption.
243. See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text (using complete CERCLA scheme and
scheme of other environmental regulation to add meaning to secured creditor exemption).
244. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
245. Id.
246. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991).
247. See supra note 16 (discussing strict, joint and several liability under CERCLA). Liability
is retroactive because past owners and operators of facilities are liable if disposal took place during
their tenure. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). Past owners with actual
knowledge of release or threatened release of hazardous waste on the property cannot escape
liability by selling the property unless they disclose this knowledge to prospective buyers. Id. §
101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C). Consequently, in effect then the previous owner is liable
unless the information necessary to discount the property for the possible liability is disclosed.
248. See supra note 16 (discussing strict, joint and several liability under CERCLA). Of
course, the PRP faced with a judgement for response costs has a common law right of contribution
from other liable parties. See CERCLA § 107(e)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1988) (stating that
CERCLA does not preclude any cause of action an owner or operator might otherwise have).
CERCLA § 107(e)(1) prevents the contractual transfers of liability for the release or threatened
release of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1). CERCLA § 107(e)(2) makes explicit that claims
by subrogation or otherwise are not effected by this section. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2).
249. See Dower, supra note 1, at 186-7 (discussing the inequities involved in CERCLA's
statutory scheme of taxation and liability). In addition Dower claims the CERCLA sends mixed
incentive signals to hazardous waste producers. Id.
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waste sites.20 Using this analysis, holding secured creditors liable for hazardous
waste clean up is arguably no more extreme than holding transporters or
generators of hazardous wastes liable for cleanup costs. Secured creditors of
hazardous waste site owners have as much, if not more, power to influence
proper waste disposal than a generator sending waste to a dump-site for
disposal.2sl Following this line of reasoning, the holding in Fleet Factors would




The second step in the comparison of CERCLA's secured creditor ex-
emption to other environmental legislation is to consider how secured creditor
liability, and more generally CERCLA liability, fits into a complete program
of environmental legislation.23 CERCLA is the second and most recent part
of a two-part program dealing with hazardous waste disposal.2 The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the other part of the scheme.
25s
RCRA governs present and future hazardous waste disposal practices by
mandating the process for control of hazardous wastes from creation to
ultimate disposal.216 Under RCRA, the EPA developed a manifest system to
track hazardous wastes at all points in the cycle.2 The manifest's purpose is
to determine when and where any transgression in the handling of hazardous
waste occurs.28
Congress passed RCRA to control the present and future treatment of
hazardous waste.269 CERCLA's purpose is to deal with past hazardous waste
disposal problems3m The decision in Fleet Factors runs afoul of CERCLA's
primarily backward-looking goal. The decision in Fleet Factors rests, at least
in part, on a policy of increasing lender involvement in the current waste
disposal practices of their debtors. 261 However, the policy goals announced in
250. Id.
251. See generally R. TrGom, STRucTumN o Co wacIA. LoAN AGREmmrs (1984) (describing
in detail various loan provisions available to lenders and effects of these provisions). Lending
institutions may vary their degree of control over debtors by inclusion of various loan covenants
ranging from the definition of payment terms to agreements by the debtor to forebear particular
actions or to affirmatively act in accordance with the terms of a loan agreement. Id.
252. See supra notes 163-82 and accompanying text (discussing holding of court in Fleet
Factors).
253. See infra notes 254-58 and accompanying text (discussing other environmental legislation).
254. See Frank and Atkeson, supra note 32, at I (describing legislative program preceding
passage of CERCLA). The passage of CERCLA followed a spate of environmental legislation by
Congress during the 1970s designed to control air and water pollution, groundwater contamination,
chemical manufacturing, solid waste, and hazardous substance and waste. Id. at 1-2.
255. See id. (describing legislative program preceding passage of CERCLA).
256. See Dower, supra note 1, at 161-68 (describing RCRA and 1984 Amendments to RCRA).
257. Id. at 163.
258. Id. Unfortunately, as Dower describes, most hazardous waste never leaves its point of
origin and therefore does not enter the manifest tracking system. Id.
259. See Frank and Atkeson, supra note 32, at I (describing legislative program preceding
passage of CERCLA).
260. See id. at 1-2 (describing purpose for enacting CERCLA).
261. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d. 1550, 1558 (discussing Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of CERCLA's underlying policy goals regarding liability of secured credi-
tors), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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Fleet Factors exceed the purpose of CERCLA, which is to identify parties
responsible for and financially able to clean up past hazardous waste disposal.
Sources outside the judiciary are aware of the ambiguities manifest. in
CERCLA's secured creditor exemption and are taking action.? At least in
part because of concern over lender liability, two Congressmen introduced
bills in the 101st Congress to address ambiguities in' CERCLA.2 A bill
introduced by Congressman LaFalce proposes to change the wording of the
secured creditor exemption to include any lending institution that acquires
ownership or control of contaminated property pursuant to the terms of a
security interest.m Congressman LaFalce's bill expands the secured creditor
exemption to cover lenders who acquire ownership because of a lease governed
by federal or state banking authorities.7 Congressman LaFalce's bill ends the
indefiniteness of the secured creditor exemption over which courts have
struggled.26
Unfortunately, the proposed bill creates a'windfall for lenders in situations
factually similar to Maryland Bank and Trust.2 LaFalce's bill puts secured
creditors that foreclose in a better position than any other bidder at the
foreclosure sale because any other new owner would be liable for releases or
threatened releases of hazardous waste while the secured creditor would not.
Congressman LaFalce's bill creates an exempt class of owners.20
In addition to Congressman LaFalce's bill, Congressman Weldon intro-
duced an amendment to the innocent landowner defense created by SARA.?'
The purpose of the amendment is to establish some definiteness in the due
diligence requirements of the current innocent landowner defenseYm The
amendment creates a rebuttable presumption of due diligence if the prospective
purchaser performs a Phase I Environmental audit as defined in the bill.7
Congressman Weldon's bill does not help answer the problem of interpreting
the secured creditor exemption, but the bill would provide a method for
262. See id. (describing increased monitoring of debtors by secured creditors as a policy goal
of CERCLA).
263. See infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text (describing attempts from several sources
to correct CERCLA's shortcomings).
264. See H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (addressing specifically lender liability); see
also H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., Ist. Sess. (1989) (addressing innocent landowner defense).
265. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § (a)(l)(A)(i) (1990).
266. Id. at § (a)(l)(A)(v).
267. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text (discussing Congressman LaFalce's bill).
268. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Maryland Bank
and Trust).
269. See H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § (a)(l)(A)(i)-(v) (1990) (changing definition of
owner or operator in CERCLA to exclude from liability lenders acquiring ownership through a
security agreement).
270. Id.
271. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., Ist. Sess. (1989).
272. See Testimony of Congressman Curt Weldon, before the Subcommittee on Transportation
and Hazardous Waste Materials (August 2, 1990) (describing problems with administering innocent
landowner defense).
273. Id. at § (C)(i).
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foreclosing lenders to protect themselves because it clearly establishes the
requirements that a lender must meet to satisfy the innocent landowner
defense.- 74
The actions described above illustrate that lender liability under CERCLA
is a complex problem with which each of the three branches of our government
is attempting to dealY 5 For several reasons, the legislature is the preferred
branch to correct the problem of assigning liability to secured creditors under
CERCLA.276 One reason is that the legislative history of CERCLA is too
scanty to allow for a judicial resolutionm Also, because no true split of
authority exists between the Eleventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals on the meaning of the secured creditor exemption exists, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will decide the boundaries of the secured creditor
exemption.278 The Supreme Court already declined to hear the Fleet Factors
petition presented to it in October 1990. 9
Another reason mandating a legislative solution is that the question of
when to hold secured creditors liable is a question of policy, and policy is
ultimately a legislative issue.2 ° Lastly, the EPA cannot fix a lender liability
274. See H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess. § 2 (1989) (proposing amendment to CERCLA
§ 101(35) to provide rebuttable presumption of due diligence if Phase I Environmental Audit
performed). See also Testimony, supra note 272 (describing effect of Congressman Weldon's
proposed bill on secured creditors).
275. See Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under Superfund, Nat'l.
L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 18, col. 1. (hypothesizing how each branch of government might react to
Fleet Factors). Soon after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fleet Factors, the House Subcommittee
on Transportation and Hazardous Material held a hearing to take comment on alternatives for
addressing lender. liability. See Testimony of John J. LaFalce, Chairman of the House Small
Business Committee, before the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and
Hazardous Materials, 1 (August 2, 1990). Both Congressman LaFalce and Congressman Weldon
spoke on how their respective bills can help solve the problem of lender liability under CERCLA.
See id. (describing purpose of Congressman LaFalce's bill); Testimony, supra note 272 (describing
purpose of Congressman Weldon's bill). More significantly, EPA Assistant Administrator for
Enf6rcement James Strock announced that the EPA would propose a rulemaking to interpret the
secured creditor exemption. Freeman, supra, at 20 n.29.
276. See infra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (outlining reasons supporting legislative
solution).
277. See supra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (describing several courts attempts to
interpret secured creditor exemption).
278. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing interpretations of secured
creditor exemption by Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals).
279. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), denying cert. to, 901 F.2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
280. See W. EsmuDao & P. FRCiKEY, CAMs AND MATERMIS ON LEGIsLATimN: STATuTES AND
TE CREATON OF PtLIc PoucY 240-335 (1988) (describing various theories of creation of public
policy through legislative process). The Constitution grants to Congress all legislative powers. U.S.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 1. Both the classical common law view and the classical civil law view of the
role of the legislature in making law require that judges look to the legislature to begin any
interpretation of a statute. W. EsKRIOGE, supra, at 243. Differing legal philosophies give varying
weights to the primacy of statutes, especially those statutes in derogation of the common law. Id.
at 241. Both legal process scholars and law and economics scholars recognize statutes as the
statement of public policy. Id.
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problem that the EPA helped to create. 211 Because the agency did not hesitate
to join lenders as PRPs in past suits, an agency rule broadening exemptions
for lenders would send mixed signals to the judiciary. 2 The agency could
control lender liability to some extent by not joining the lenders in future
recovery actions. 28 However, the private right of action and the right of
contributing parties to seek recovery from other unnamed PRPs limits the
effectiveness of an EPA rulemaking interpreting the secured creditor exemp-
tion.284
Any proposed change to CERCLA should address several issues. 25 First,
Congress must decide as a matter of policy whether creditors that lend money
to industry should be liable as a class for their debtor's environmental
damage.m As discussed above, CERCLA's liability scheme does not rely on
causation or fairness.3 If Congress intends to extend CERCLA liability to
secured lenders, then Congress should amend CERCLA to reflect this policy.
Alternatively, Congress can send a clear policy signal both to lenders and to
the judiciary by adopting a concrete test for secured creditor liability, such as
the day-to-day operations test first established in Mirabile.288 Second, any
exemption for lenders should prevent a windfall for the foreclosing creditor.2 9
281. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text (describing EPA's role in enforcement
actions).
282. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (joining
of secured creditor by EPA in suit for recovery of response costs associated with hazardous waste
cleanup); United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D.Md. 1986)
(same); In re T.P. Long Chemical Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (seeking
recovery by EPA from secured creditor implead by original defendant).
283. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text (describing EPA's role in CERCLA
enforcement actions).
284. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (describing avenues of enforcement in
CERCLA statute). In response to uncertainties created by judicial decisions interpreting the secured
creditor exemption, the EPA promulgated a proposed interpretive rule. See EPA Draft Proposal,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990) (establishing purpose of proposed interpretive rule).
The proposed rule sets out the agencies interpretation of "indicia of ownership" and "primarily
to protect the security interest." Id. at 1163. The proposed EPA rule allows secured creditors to
police loans, undertake loan workouts and foreclose on and hold secured property for up to six
months without jeopardizing the lender's secured creditor exemption. Id. at 1164-65. The EPA
interpretive rule may provide guidance for lenders and for courts, an interpretive rule does not
have the force of law. See ScswARTz, ADmasrATwr LAW 158-60 (2d ed. 1984) (comparing
relative effects of substantive and interpretive rules in administrative law).
285. See infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text (describing issues that any change to
CERCLA should address).
286. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (discussing policy as interpreted by
Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors).
287. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's liability scheme).
288. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990)
(establishing Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of proper policy goals of CERCLA with respect to
secured creditors), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). The Eleventh Circuit decided that the day-
to-day operations from the holding in Mirabile did not conform to the language or the legislative
policy of CERCLA. Id. at 1556-58.
289. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text (discussing possible windfall for creditors
under Congressman LaFalce's bill).
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Creditors who retain the title to property should be treated as any other
owner. 0 Lenders can protect themselves from owner liability by meeting the
requirements of the innocent landowner defense. 29'
Finally, the secured creditor exemption should consider the role of lenders
in the daily functioning of industry.292 Lenders have significant expertise in
work-outs and salvaging of businesses. 293 A secured creditor exemption should
encourage lender involvement with ailing businesses rather than create a hands-
off situation where the lender forecloses on the security interest or writes off
the loan before attempting any remediation of the business. 29 When lenders
can estimate the risks of liability for hazardous waste cleanup, the market for
secured loans can adjust through such mechanisms as interest rates and altered
loan procedures. 295 Consequently, any decision on holding secured creditors
liable under CERCLA is an economic decision based on the distribution of
CoStS.
29
In the wake of the decision in Fleet Factors, lenders would be better off
without the secured creditor exemption. 29 Without the secured creditor ex-
emption, lender involvement must rise to that of an owner or operator.an
Because of the inconsistency of past judicial decisions interpreting the secured
creditor exemption, any legislative attempt to refine the exemption requires
plain wording and extensive legislative history for support.m
JAMs EDWARD ENOCH, JR.
290. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md.
1986) (predicting windfalls for foreclosing secured lenders if secured lenders are exempt from
owner liability under CERCLA).
291. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (describing innocent landowner defense).
292. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (describing Eleventh Circuit's vision of
lender involvement).
293. See R. NAssanRa, Tim LEaNDE's HANDBOOK, 61-68 (1986) (describing lender involvement
in loan workouts and salvaging failing businesses). Nassberg describes typical lender reactions to
a failing business including the close monitoring of the debtor's expenditures, appointment of a
lender representative to the debtor's board of directors and the selective enforcement or forbearance
of rights under the loan agreement. Id. at 66-68.
294. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (1lth Cir. 1990) (discussing
increased lender involvement as appropriate policy goal of CERCLA), cert. denied, IIl S. Ct.
752 (1991).
295. See P. SAMUMSON, EcoNoWacs, 599-600 (9th ed. 1973) (describing relationship between
risk and interest rates); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit at 6, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991)
(describing disruption of normal lending practices created by Eleventh Circuit's holding in Fleet
Factors), denying cert. to, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
296. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (describing forces that will allocate costs).
297. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (describing secured creditor exemption after
Fleet Factors as a rule of inclusion vice exclusion).
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 122-97 and accompanying text (describing varying judicial interpretations
of legislative history of CERCLA and meaning of secured creditor exemption).
